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Abstract
We develop a model in which a nancial intermediarys investment in risky assets
risk taking is excessive due to limited liability and deposit insurance, and characterize
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent nancial crisis, many countries adopted a new nancial regula-
tory framework known as Basel III which increased capital requirements, allowed them to
vary over the business cycle and complemented them with a leverage ratio (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (2011)).1 These changes were aimed at strengthening capital regu-
lation and improving the management of nancial sector risks. In this paper, we evaluate
the e¢ ciency and the welfare implications of such policies.
We develop a model in which nancial intermediariesinvestments in risky assets risk
takingmay exceed the social optimum due to limited liability and deposit insurance.2 Risk
taking over the business cycle is inuenced by monetary policy and macroprudential poli-
cies, namely nancial regulations on capital or leverage, and prot taxes. While a recent
and growing empirical literature examines risk-taking implications of various macropruden-
tial policies, our main contribution is to show that the capital or leverage regulations needed
to eliminate excessive risk taking are countercyclical.3 Our models nancial regulations
alleviate the moral hazard of intermediaries during expansions, while being more lenient in
recessions. Moreover, the optimal policies are interdependent. Monetary policy rates are
higher in the presence of leverage regulation compared to capital regulation. And, there is
a trade-o¤ between prot taxes and nancial regulations: incorporating taxes in the macro-
prudential policy toolkit allows for looser nancial regulations.4
1Regulatory capital was raised from 8 percent of risk-weighted assets under Basel II to 10:5 percent
under Basel III. A countercyclical bu¤er in the range of 0   2:5 percent may be imposed at the discretion
of national authorities if excessive credit growth is judged to lead to a buildup of risk and potential future
losses. Lastly, Basel III introduced a a simple, non-risk based leverage ratio which doesnt vary over
time. Empirical implications of such regulatory changes are analyzed in Gambacorta and Shin (2018) and
Allahrakha, Cetina, and Munyan (2018).
2We abstract from other sources of excessive risk taking, such as managersincentives, their understate-
ment of risks during a downturn, or bail-outs by regulatory agencies (Dewatripont and Freixas (2012)).
3The empirical literature on the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential policies is growing. Damar and Molico
(2016), Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2015) and Lim, Columba, Costa, Kongsamut, Otani, Saiyid, Wezel,
and Wu (2011) provide cross-country overviews of macroprudential policies and conclude that they mitigate
nancial sector risks. Bruno, Shim, and Shin (2017), Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) and Altunbas,
Binici, and Gambacorta (2018) use data on advanced and emerging market economies to show macropru-
dential policies impact bank risk and are more e¤ective during monetary tightening episodes.
4Taxation of nancial institutions to help nance the cost of nancial crises has been suggested by
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Our theoretical framework enriches the dynamic general equilibrium model with aggre-
gate and idiosyncratic uncertainty in Cociuba, Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt (2016) (henceforth,
CSU) to allow for capital and leverage regulations, and a tax on nancial intermediariesprof-
its. We examine how these macroprudential policies impact intermediariesinvestments into
safe bonds and risky projects. The latter are investments in the production technologies of
rms and can be of two types: high-risk and low-risk projects. High-risk projects are more
productive during good aggregate states and less productive during bad aggregate states
compared to low-risk projects. In this environment, we dene risk taking as excessive if
investments in high-risk projects exceed the social optimum.
Each period, intermediaries make two portfolio choices. At the rst portfolio decision,
aggregate productivity and the idiosyncratic type of intermediariesrisky projects are un-
known, and investments are subject to nancial regulations. At the second portfolio decision,
aggregate productivity is still unknown, but the type of risky projects is revealed, and inter-
mediaries use bonds as collateral in an interbank market to adjust the scale of these projects.
The rationale for modeling collateralized interbank borrowing is the empirical observation
that intermediaries borrow in the sale and repurchase market (i.e., the repo market) to al-
ter their portfolio risk (Adrian and Shin (2010)). During an expansion, when aggregate
productivity is expected to be high, intermediaries with high-risk projects (i.e., high-risk
intermediaries) trade bonds to invest more in these projects. These projects are attractive
from a social point of view due to high expected returns, and are attractive for intermediaries
because potential losses in the event of a contraction are avoided through limited liability
(as in Allen and Gale (2000)). Low-risk intermediaries on the other side of the transaction
accept bonds and reduce exposure to their risky projects with lower expected returns.
An important feature of our model is that interbank market transactions are not subject
to nancial regulations. The interpretation is that intermediaries comply with regulations
at the rst portfolio decision, which coincides with the quarterly public reporting of balance
International Monetary Fund (2010). The macroprudential role of taxes is also analyzed in Jeanne and
Korinek (2013), Bianchi and Mendoza (2013) and Keister (2016).
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sheets. Between reporting periods, regulatory arbitrage allows intermediaries to increase
risky investments and disregard regulations.5 This modeling choice is motivated by evidence
that repo transactions are used by banks to temporarily appear safer and less levered
before quarterly public disclosure periods (Munyan (2015)).6 ;7 Although interbank market
transactions in our model are unregulated, they are constrained by the amount of collateral
bonds chosen at the rst portfolio decision, which is subject to nancial regulations.
In our framework, a consolidated monetary and nancial authority optimally chooses
interest rate policy, capital or leverage regulation, and taxes on intermediariesprots to
maximize household welfare. Thus, optimal policies are interdependent. The interest rate
policy alters the bond return, and prot taxes alter the return on intermediaries equity.
Capital regulation imposes a lower bound on intermediariesequity to risky investment ratio,
while leverage regulation imposes an upper bound on intermediariestotal assets to equity
ratio. Moreover, all policies are allowed to vary over time. The state-contingent nature of
our models regulatory capital is in line with Basel III, which introduces time-variation via
countercyclical capital bu¤ers. For symmetry, we allow our models leverage regulation to
be state-contingent, although Basel III calls for a xed leverage ratio. Our paper focuses on
time-variation in nancial regulations and abstracts from risk weighting of capital.8
5The rst working paper of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Jackson et al. (1999), evaluates
the impact of Basel I and discusses the ability of banks to reduce their capital charges via regulatory arbitrage.
Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010) review more recent capital arbitrage strategies.
6Other examples of regulatory arbitrage from the recent nancial crisis are: the use of Repo 105 by
Lehman Brothers for no articulate business purpose except to reduce balance sheet at the quarter-end
(Valukas (2010, vol. 1)), and the use of special purpose entities to allow banks to move assets o¤ their
balance sheets and reduce capital requirements (Acharya and Schnabl (2009)). Dubecq, Mojon, and Ragot
(2015) model regulatory arbitrage as imperfect information about risk-weighted capital, to captures the idea
that capital regulation is di¢ cult to implement as it requires banks to evaluate their own risk exposures.
7Munyan (2015) suggests that capital requirements and the leverage ratio introduced in Basel III should
be calculated based on averages of daily data, to disincentivize intermediaries from adjusting their balance
sheets at quarter-end, and to improve the e¤ectiveness of nancial regulations. Current regulations use
quarter-end observations for capital or an average of three month-end observations for leverage. In 2014, the
U.S. passed Federal Register rule 79 FR 57725 to establish daily averaging for the leverage ratio e¤ective
starting 2018. However, given the operational burdenof daily calculations, o¤-balance sheet exposures in
the leverage ratio will still be computed as the average of three month-end observations.
8This modeling choice is motivated by Hellwig (2010), who argues for a thorough overhaul of capital
regulation because, over time, modications of the Basel accords designed to improve the risk calibration of
assets actually enabled banks to reduce regulatory capital.
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To illustrate the interdependence between policies, we examine a simplied version of
our model with i.i.d. aggregate shocks, and we derive analytical results. Here, as in the full
model, bankruptcy may occur if intermediaries do not pay the promised return to depositors
and use their limited liability to shield themselves from losses. Implementing the social op-
timum in a competitive equilibrium with bankruptcy requires (i) either capital or leverage
regulations to bind, (ii) interest rates to be higher under leverage regulation and (iii) prot
taxes to be weakly positive. Also, there is a trade-o¤ between prot taxes and nancial reg-
ulations. Implementing e¢ cient risk taking with zero taxes requires either higher regulatory
capital or lower leverage. The negative relationship between taxes and regulations in the
optimal policy toolkit carries over to our model with persistent aggregate shocks.
To quantitatively evaluate the optimal policies, we calibrate the model with persistent
aggregate shocks to the U.S. economy and its nancial sector, and examine two numerical
experiments. The optimal CAP experiment implements the social optimum with interest
rate policy, capital regulation and prot taxes, whereas the policies in the optimal LEV ex-
periment are interest rate policy, leverage regulation and prot taxes. We nd that nancial
regulations only bind in good aggregate states, when high-risk intermediaries have incentives
to engage in excessive risk taking. Moreover, interest rates are lower in the optimal CAP
experiment because capital regulation directly a¤ects the asset composition of intermediaries
and distorts the equilibrium bond return. Lastly, optimal leverage regulation implements
the social optimum with more equity compared to optimal capital regulation.
We conduct additional experiments to highlight di¤erences between capital and leverage
regulations. We show that variations in the capital regulation bound which restricts the
equity to risky investment ratio in the range contemplated by policymakers (i.e., from 8
percent in Basel II to 10:5 percent in Basel III) have a weak e¤ect on risk taking in the
economy. However, variations in the leverage regulation bound which restricts the total
assets to equity ratio have a stronger impact on risk taking, because bond returns are
higher under leverage regulation. From a practical point of view, a reason to prefer leverage
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regulation is that it is easier to implement than capital regulation, which requires risk-weights
for all assets on an intermediarys balance sheet (Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2015)).
The banking literature has previously acknowledged that time-variation in capital require-
ments or leverage restrictions should be incorporated in nancial regulation. For example,
Kashyap and Stein (2004) argue that time-varying capital requirements are the optimal out-
come if the goal is to reduce costs of default, while also maintaining bank lending during
recessions. Repullo (2013) shows in a simple model that optimal bank capital requirements
are lower in economic downturns. Blum (2008) argues that a risk-independent leverage ratio
is necessary to induce truthful reporting of risk and to implement Basel II e¤ectively.
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we establish that time-varying nancial
regulations allow to implement e¢ cient risk taking. Then, we compare the e¤ectiveness of
countercyclical capital or leverage regulations in deterring risk taking, in spite of the fact
that intermediaries can borrow in an unregulated interbank market to alter the composition
of their portfolios. Lastly, we measure welfare implications of alternate nancial regulations.
Through these contributions, our paper relates to the literature that integrates banking
regulation into macro models. Van den Heuvel (2009) measures the welfare cost of capital
requirements in a model in which bank moral hazard arises due to deposit insurance. Chris-
tensen, Meh, and Moran (2011) study a model in which bank capital arises endogenously
to solve an asymmetric information problem between banks and creditors. In their model,
countercyclical capital regulation is welfare improving, especially when nancial shocks are
an important part of economic uctuations. Angeloni and Faia (2013) study a model with
bank runs and nominal rigidities and show that maximizing social welfare requires counter-
cyclical capital regulation and a monetary policy rule that responds to nancial conditions.
Benes and Kumhof (2015) show that countercyclical capital bu¤ers are welfare improving
in a model in which bank loans are risky because the lending rate is not state-contingent.
Collard, Dellas, Diba, and Loisel (2017) show that optimal capital regulation is procyclical
and covaries negatively with monetary policy in a model in which the latter has no impact
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on bank risk taking. However, when their model allows monetary policy to have an impact
on risk taking, optimal capital regulation and monetary policy are both countercyclical.
Adrian and Boyarchenko (2018) study the interaction of capital and liquidity regulation in
a dynamic general equilibrium model. Aliaga-Díaz, Olivero, and Powell (2018) show that
countercyclical capital requirements have stabilization properties relative to constant require-
ments. Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2014) show that countercyclical capital requirements
reduce the volatility of macro aggregates.9 In comparison to these papers, our model focuses
on capital and leverage regulation constraints and compares their e¤ectiveness.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the decentralized environment and
the social planners problem. Section 3 presents results from a simplied version of our model
in which we analytically derive policies that implement the social optimum as a competitive
equilibrium. Section 4 describes the quantitative analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Economy
We enrich the model in CSU to allow for capital and leverage regulations, as well as a tax
on nancial intermediaries prots. Our goal is to examine the e¤ectiveness of nancial
regulations in controlling the risk taking of intermediaries.
The economy is populated by a measure one of households, a measure m of nonnancial
rms, a measure 1   m of nancial intermediaries, and a government. The existence of
intermediaries is motivated by the assumption that households cannot invest directly in
some of the economys risky assets (Gale (2004)).
Time is discrete and innite. Each period, the economy is subject to an exogenous aggre-
gate shock that a¤ects the productivity of all rms. The aggregate shock st 2 fs; sg follows
a rst-order Markov process and is persistent. The history of aggregate shocks up to time
t is st: In addition, nancial intermediaries are subject to idiosyncratic uncertainty that de-
termine their type. The idiosyncratic type j 2 fh; lg is i.i.d. across time and across nancial
9In our model, lower capital or leverage bounds or lower prot taxes raise the volatility of output.
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intermediaries.10 Figure 1 summarizes the timing of events in our model.
2.1 Financial Sector
Financial intermediaries choose portfolios of safe and risky investments to maximize ex-
pected prots. Similar to CSU, intermediaries have limited liability and are partly funded
through insured deposits. These features create a moral hazard problem, which makes risky
investments attractive for intermediaries. Moreover, in each period, after type j is revealed,
intermediaries can adjust the scale of risky investments by borrowing or lending against col-
lateral in an interbank market. The novelty of this paper relative to CSU is that we model
prot taxes and nancial regulations to limit intermediariesrisk taking incentives.
The risky projects of intermediaries are investments into the production technologies of
rms.11 With probability j, a risky project is of type j 2 fh; lg and has productivity
qj (st). We assume (i) the probabilities, h and l = 1 h, are time and state invariant and
known, (ii) the high-risk projects are more productive during a good aggregate state and less
productive during a bad aggregate state compared with low-risk projects, qh (s) > ql (s) 
ql (s) > qh (s), and (iii) intermediaries cannot trade contingent claims on their projects.
Each period, nancial intermediaries make two portfolio decisions. At the time of the rst
portfolio decision, the aggregate shock, st, and the type, j, are unknown and intermediaries
are subject to nancial regulation constraints. Intermediaries are identical and make the
same portfolio investments in government bonds, b (st 1), and risky projects, k (st 1). At
the time of the second portfolio decision, the aggregate shock st is unknown, while the type
j 2 fh; lg is revealed. Intermediaries are referred to as being high-risk or low-risk, based on
the type j of their risky projects. Intermediaries can trade bonds in an interbank market
in order to adjust the amount of resources invested in the risky projects. The resulting
capital is kj (st 1)  k (st 1) + ~p (st 1)~bj (st 1), where k (st 1) is the initial risky investment
10The assumption that idiosyncratic types are i.i.d. simplies the computation. While considering per-
sistent types may deliver interesting implications, we leave this extension for future research.
11For simplicity, we abstract from loans between intermediaries and rms, and information asymmetries à
la Bernanke and Gertler (1989). We assume intermediaries operate the rmsproduction technology directly.
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and ~bj (st 1) are bonds traded at the interbank market price ~p (st 1). The second portfolio
decisions are not subject to nancial regulation constraints. Implicitly, we assume that the
rst portfolio decision coincides with the quarterly public reporting of balance sheets, and
intermediaries abide by the nancial regulations at this time. Between reporting periods,
regulatory arbitrage allows intermediaries to increase their risky investments.
The assumption regarding the timing of the aggregate shock and idiosyncratic uncertainty
is crucial for the existence of an interbank market in this model, and captures the idea that
information about the riskiness of projects evolves over time.12 As a result, intermediaries
adjust their portfolios, but may be constrained in their choices by the amount of bonds,
b (st 1), available as collateral for interbank borrowing. The need for collateral in interbank
borrowing is motivated by a debt enforcement problem à la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
After the two portfolio decisions, the aggregate shock st realizes at the beginning of
period t. Intermediaries choose labor demand for the risky projects, lj (st), and produce
using technology qj (st) [kj (st 1)]

[lj (s
t)]
1  , where 1        0 and ;  2 [0; 1]. If
 > 0 there is a xed factor of production, whose returns are paid to equity holders. The
xed factor prevents a corner solution in the intermediariesproblem and helps the calibrated
model match the equity to total asset ratio and the debt to total assets ratio of the U.S.
nancial sector. Following production, intermediaries unable to pay the promised rate of
return on deposits declare bankruptcy.
Portfolio Choice in the Bond Market
At the time of the rst portfolio decision, the aggregate shock, st, and the type, j, are
unknown. There is a measure 1   m of identical nancial intermediaries that choose de-
posit demand, d (st 1), safe bonds, b (st 1), and risky investments, k (st 1), to maximize the
12If st and j were known at the beginning of each period, resources from households would be allocated so
as to equalize intermediariesmarginal rates of return, and there would be no need for an interbank market.
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expected prots net of taxes given in problem (P1) subject to nancial regulation constraints.
max
fd(st 1); b(st 1), k(st 1)g
X
j2fh;lg
j
X
stjst 1

 
st
  1    st 1Vj  st (P1)
subject to:
z
 
st 1

+ d
 
st 1

= k
 
st 1

+ p
 
st 1

b
 
st 1

(1)
Vj
 
st

= max
8>>>><>>>>:
266664
qj (st)
h
k (st 1) + ~p (st 1)~bj (st 1)
i
[lj (s
t)]
1  
+qj (st) (1  )
h
k (st 1) + ~p (st 1)~bj (st 1)
i
+
h
b (st 1)  ~bj (st 1)
i
 Wj (st) lj (st) Rd (st 1) d (st 1)
377775 ; 0
9>>>>=>>>>; (2)
z (st 1)
k (st 1)
 CAP  st 1 (3)
z (st 1)
d (st 1)
 LEV  st 1 (4)
In problem (P1), Vj (st) are gross prots for intermediary j at history st and are taxed
at rate,  (st 1). Since households own the nancial intermediaries, prots at history st are
valued at the householdsmarginal utility of consumption (weighted by ' (st), the probability
of history st), denoted by  (st)  ' (st) =C (st). Intermediaries take as given  (st), the bond
price, p (st 1), the interbank market price, ~p (st 1), the wage rate, Wj (st), the return on
deposits, Rd (st 1), the tax rate,  (st 1), the regulatory bounds, CAP (st 1) and LEV (st 1),
the bonds traded in the interbank market, ~bj (st 1), the labor input, lj (st), and the equity
chosen by households, z (st 1).13 Here, ~bj (st 1) is chosen after the type, j, is realized, while
lj (s
t) and Wj (st) are determined after the type, j, and the aggregate shock, st, are realized.
The balance sheet of an intermediary (equation (1)) shows that portfolio investments are
funded through equity, z (st 1), and deposits, d (st 1). Equity returns are contingent on the
realization of the aggregate state in the period when they are paid, while returns on deposits
are not (i.e., Vj (st) depends on st; while Rd (st 1) does not). In addition, equity returns are
bounded below by zero due to the limited liability of intermediaries (i.e., Vj (st) cannot be
13Due to limited liability and deposit insurance, nancial intermediaries prefer to be funded via deposits
rather than equity. We assume that equity in our model is determined by households.
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negative, as seen in equation (2)), while deposit returns are guaranteed by deposit insurance.
The limited liability introduces an asymmetry that allows intermediaries to be protable in
good aggregate states while shielding them from losses in bad aggregate states.
Gross prots of intermediaries (equation (2)) equal revenues from investments net of
payments to labor and to deposits. Note that the value of the undepreciated capital stock
invested in the risky projects (i.e., qj (st) (1  )
h
k (st 1) + ~p (st 1)~bj (st 1)
i
, where  is the
depreciation rate), uctuates with the productivity level, as in Merton (1973) and Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010), to capture the idea that while capital may not depreciate in a physical
sense during contraction periods, it depreciates in an economic sense.14
We augment the model in CSU by introducing prot taxes,  (st 1), and two types of
nancial regulations. Capital regulation (equation (3)) requires nancial intermediaries to
hold a ratio of equity to risky investment at history st 1 of at least CAP (st 1). This
minimum regulatory capital is state-contingent, in line with Basel III, which introduces
time-variation via countercyclical capital bu¤ers (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2011)). Leverage regulation (equation (4)) restricts the amount of deposit liabilities nan-
cial intermediaries are able to accept to fraction 1
LEV (st 1) of equity. To understand why
equation (4) is a constraint on leverage, recall that leverage is dened as the ratio of to-
tal assets to equity. Using the notation in Problem (P1), leverage is
k(st 1)+p(st 1)b(st 1)
z(st 1) =
z(st 1)+d(st 1)
z(st 1) = 1 +
d(st 1)
z(st 1) . Hence, leverage regulation puts an upper bound on the ratio
of deposit borrowing to equity. The Basel III regulation introduces a xed leverage ratio
as a supplement to capital regulation. In our framework, we allow leverage regulation to
be state-contingent. Either state-contingent capital or leverage regulation implements the
social optimum when combined with a prot tax and optimally chosen interest rate policy.
The prot tax on nancial intermediaries allows the marginal products of capital to
be equated across the di¤erent sectors, in competitive equilibria that implement the social
optimum. In particular, the nonnancial sector in our model is fully equity funded (see
14For suporting empirical evidence, see Ramey and Shapiro (2001) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
11
Section 2:2). The nancial sector is funded via both equity and debt. The tax rate on
intermediaries reduces the return to nancial sector equity to allow for equalization of the
marginal products of capital in the nancial and nonnancial sectors. Without taxes, the
equity required in the nancial sector to implement the social optimum would be higher.
Portfolio Adjustments via the Interbank Market
At the time of the second portfolio decision, the aggregate shock, st, is unknown, while
the type, j 2 fh; lg, is known. High-risk (j = h) and low-risk (j = l) intermediaries choose
whether to adjust the riskiness of their portfolios by trading bonds, ~bj (st 1), in an interbank
market. Intermediaries choose ~bj (st 1) and, implicitly, kj (st 1)  k (st 1)+ ~p (st 1)~bj (st 1)
to solve problem (P2), taking as given the initial portfolio decisions, d (st 1) ; b (st 1), k (st 1),
as well as  (st), p (st 1), ~p (st 1), Wj (st), Rd (st 1),  (st 1), lj (st), and z (st 1).
max
f~bj(st 1), kj(st 1)g
X
stjst 1

 
st
  1    st 1Vj  st (P2)
subject to:   k (s
t 1)
~p (st 1)
 ~bj
 
st 1
  b  st 1
where Vj (st) is dened in equation (2). Inada conditions guarantee that kj (st 1)  k (st 1)+
~p (st 1)~bj (st 1) > 0, and hence the only potentially binding constraint in problem (P2) is
~bj (s
t 1)  b (st 1).15 Here, ~bj (st 1) can be interpreted as sales of bonds or, alternatively, as
repurchasing agreements (repos).16 For this reason, we use the terms interbank market and
repo market interchangeably. As in CSU, we abstract from haircuts on collateral. We also
15The assumption that interbank (repo) borrowing is collateralized, ~bj
 
st 1
  b  st 1, is motivated
by a debt enforcement problem à la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Namely, lenders in the interbank market
cannot force borrowers to repay debts unless these debts are secured by collateral.
16While we model ~bj
 
st 1

as bond sales, incorporating explicitly the repurchase of bonds which is
typical in a repo agreement would yield identical results. Specically, if no bankruptcy occurs, then inter-
mediaries have the resources necessary to repurchase the bonds from the counterparty. This simply amounts
to a reshu­ ing of assets among intermediaries before prots are paid as returns to equity holders. When
some intermediaries go bankrupt, they are unable to repurchase the bonds and the counterparty keeps them,
as is true in the data. Equity holders receive no returns from bankrupt intermediaries. In either case,
payments to equity holders are identical regardless of whether we model the repurchase of bonds or not.
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abstract from maturity mismatch, but capture the idea that repos enable risky investments.
This is consistent with evidence that while repos have short-term maturities, they are rolled
over and used to fund illiquid investments (Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014)).
The capital and leverage regulation constraints in (3) and (4) are not imposed in problem
(P2). Our implicit assumption is that intermediaries report prots and pay prot taxes to
the government, but they need not abide by nancial regulations throughout the period.
Indeed, Munyan (2015) shows that the repo market allows for window dressing, the practice
of adjusting investments prior to public disclosure periods to make balance sheets seem
safer. Using daily tri-party repo transactions from 2008 to 2014, Munyan (2015) documents
a pronounced decline in repo borrowing at quarter-ends and a subsequent rebound at the
beginning of next quarter. The repo window dressing documented by Munyan (2015) is
di¤erent from the Repo 105 transactions that Lehman Brothers used to hide true leverage.
While Repo 105 may be an accounting trick unique to Lehman, it gives an idea of the
innovations possible within the banking industry to undermine nancial regulations.
Our model is consistent with evidence that repos are an important margin of balance
sheet adjustment by intermediaries (Adrian and Shin (2010)) and that repos allow par-
ticipants to hedge against market risk exposures arising from other activities (Financial
Stability Board (2012)). In our model, repo borrowing is socially benecial as it reallocates
resources towards intermediaries who are expected to be more productive. In expansions,
high-risk intermediaries lower their bond holdings to invest more in their risky projects. In
contractions, low-risk intermediaries make similar changes to their portfolios.
While repos are benecial, they may enable intermediaries to take advantage of their
limited liability and overinvest in risky projects. More bond purchases at the time of the
rst portfolio decision make balance sheets seem safer, but may later lead to increased risk
taking through collateralized borrowing. Although intermediaries start out as identical each
period, the funds they receive from households vary with the aggregate state, allowing for
interesting model dynamics, such as sustained high investments in high-risk projects.
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Labor Demand and Production
After the two portfolio decisions, the aggregate shock, st 2 fs; sg, is realized. Financial
intermediaries choose labor demand, lj (st), to equate the wage rate with the marginal prod-
uct of labor, i.e.,Wj (st) = (1     ) qj (st) [kj (st 1)] [lj (st)]  . Production takes place,
returns on assets are paid and bankruptcy may occur.
We note that labor is an essential input into production. If we abstract from labor, then
expected returns on nancial sector equity in our model are high, pushing households to
choose zero deposits, which is counterfactual. We assume the labor input is chosen after the
intermediaries know j and st, for computational simplicity.
2.2 Nonnancial sector
There is a measure m of identical nonnancial rms that choose capital, km (st 1), and
labor, lm (st), to maximize prots.
max
fkm(st 1), lm(st)g

ym
 
st

+ qm (st) (1  ) km
 
st 1
 Rm  st km  st 1 Wm  st lm  st	
subject to: ym
 
st

= qm (st)

km
 
st 1
 
lm
 
st
1 
Here, capital is funded entirely through household equity, km (st 1) =M (st 1) =m, the wage
rate is Wm (st), and the return to capital (equity), Rm (st), depends on the productivity of
the technology, qm (st), which satises: qh (s)  qm (s) > ql (s)  ql (s) > qm (s) > qh (s).
The nonnancial sector is introduced to allow our model to be consistent with U.S. data,
showing a high equity to deposit ratio for households and a low equity to deposit ratio in the
nancial sector, and to match the relative importance of the two sectors in U.S. production.
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2.3 Households
There is a measure one of identical households who maximize expected utility.
max
fC(st), Dh(st), Z(st), M(st)g
1X
t=0
X
st
t'
 
st

logC
 
st

subject to: w
 
st

= Rd
 
st 1

Dh
 
st 1

+Rz
 
st

Z
 
st 1

+Rm
 
st

M
 
st 1

+mWm
 
st

+ (1  m)lWl
 
st

+ (1  m)hWh
 
st

+ T
 
st

w
 
st

= C
 
st

+M
 
st

+Dh
 
st

+ Z
 
st

Here,  is the discount factor and ' (st) is the probability of history st. At the beginning
of period t; the aggregate state st is revealed, and household wealth, w (st), composed of
returns on previous period investments, wage income and lump-sum taxes (T (st) < 0) or
transfers (T (st)  0) from the government, is realized. Households spend their wealth on
consumption, C (st), and investments that will pay returns next period.
Investments take the form of deposits, nancial sector equity and nonnancial sector
equity. Deposits, Dh (st 1), earn a xed return, Rd (st 1), which is guaranteed by de-
posit insurance. Equity invested in the nancial sector, Z (st 1), is a risky investment that
gives households a state-contingent claim to the prots of the intermediaries. The return
per unit of equity is Rz (st) = 1
z(st 1)
P
j2fh;lg j [1   (st 1)]Vj (st). Similarly, the equity
invested in the nonnancial sector, M (st 1), receives a state-contingent return, Rm (st).
In an interior solution, households invest in all three assets and receive an equity pre-
mium. Formally, returns to deposits and equity are related through the Euler equations,P
st+1jst
t+1'(st+1)
C(st+1)

Rz (st+1) Rd (st) =Pst+1jst t+1'(st+1)C(st+1) [Rz (st+1) Rm (st+1)] = 0:
Each household supplies one unit of labor inelastically. We assume that labor markets
are segmented. Fraction m of a households time is spent working in the nonnancial
sector, and fraction 1   m is spent in the nancial sector. Within the nancial sector, a
households time is split between high-risk and low-risk intermediaries according to shares
j; where h + l = 1: Given that there are measure one of households and measure one of
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rms, labor supplied to each rm is one unit for any realization of the aggregate state.
2.4 Government
The government issues bonds that nancial intermediaries hold as an investment or use
as a medium of exchange in the repo market. The government sells bonds, B (st 1), at
price, p (st 1), and deposits the proceeds with nancial intermediaries. Each intermediary
purchases risk-free assets b (st 1) = B (st 1) = (1  m) and receives Dg (st 1) = (1  m) of
government deposits, where Dg (st 1) = p (st 1)B (st 1). To guarantee the return on de-
posits the government provides deposit insurance at zero price, which is nanced through
household taxation and taxes on intermediariesprots.17 The government balances its bud-
get after production takes place at the beginning of period t:
T
 
st

+B
 
st 1

+
 
st

= Rd
 
st 1

Dg
 
st 1

+ 
 
st 1
  (1  m) X
j2fh;lg
jVj
 
st

Here, (st) is deposit insurance necessary to guarantee the return on deposits, Rd (st 1).
Given limited liability, intermediaries may pay a deposit return smaller than Rd (st 1), which
ensures that they break even, while the remainder is covered by deposit insurance.
2.5 Market clearing
The labor market clearing conditions state that labor demanded by nancial intermedi-
aries and nonnancial rms equals labor supplied by households: mlm (st) = m and
(1  m)jlj (st) = (1  m)j for each j 2 fh; lg. This implies lm (st) = lh (st) = ll (st) = 1:
The goods market clearing condition equates total output produced with aggregate con-
17Pennacchi (2006, pg. 14) documents that, since 1996 and prior to the crisis, deposit insurance has been
essentially free for U.S. banks. In our model, the assumption of a zero price of deposit insurance is not
crucial. What matters is that the insurance is not priced in a way to eliminate moral hazard. This means,
for example, that deposit insurance cannot be contingent on the portfolio decisions of the intermediaries.
Calem and Rob (1999) analyze the impact of capital regulation in a model in which undercapitalized banks
get charged a deposit insurance premium and nd that the premium aggravates the moral hazard problem.
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sumption and investment. Output produced by nonnancial rms is mqm (st) [km (st 1)]
,
while output produced by nancial rms is (1  m)
P
j2fl;hg jqj (s
t) [kj (s
t 1)], where
kj (s
t 1) are resources allocated to the risky projects after repo market trading.
C
 
st

+M
 
st

+Dh
 
st

+ Z
 
st

= mqm (st)
h
km
 
st 1

+ (1  ) km
 
st 1
i
+(1  m)
X
j2fl;hg
jqj (st)
h
kj
 
st 1

+ (1  ) kj
 
st 1
i
There are four nancial market clearing conditions. Deposits demanded by intermedi-
aries equal deposits from households and the government: Dh (st 1)+Dg (st 1) = D (st 1) =
(1  m) d (st 1). Bond sales by the government equal the bond purchases by nancial in-
termediaries: B (st 1) = (1  m) b (st 1). Interbank repo market trades between the dif-
ferent types of intermediaries must balance:
P
j2fl;hg j~bj (s
t 1) = 0. Lastly, total equity
invested by households in the nancial and nonnancial sectors is distributed over the rms:
M (st 1) = mkm (st 1) and Z (st 1) = (1  m) z (st 1).
2.6 Social Planner
We examine a social planners problem to determine the e¢ cient allocation of resources. We
maintain the assumption on the timing of shocks to allow the social planners environment
to be comparable to the decentralized one. In a slight abuse of language, we refer to the
technologies available to the social planner as belonging to nancial and nonnancial sectors.
At the beginning of period t; the aggregate shock, st, is realized and production takes
place using capital that the planner has allocated to the di¤erent technologies of production:
km (s
t 1) for the nonnancial sector and kh (st 1) and kl (st 1) for the high-risk and low-risk
technologies of the nancial sector. Output is then split between consumption and capital
to be used in production at t+1. At the time of this decision, the type, j, and the aggregate
shock, st+1, are unknown, and the social planner allocates kb (st) resources to all nancial
sector technologies. Once j is revealed, the social planner reallocates resources between the
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high-risk and low-risk technologies.
The social planner (SP) solves the problem below.
maxE
1X
t=0
t logC
 
st

subject to:
C
 
st

+ mkm
 
st

+ (1  m) kb
 
st

= mqm (st)
h
km
 
st 1

+ (1  ) km
 
st 1
i
+ (1  m)
X
j2fh;lg
jqj (st)
h
kj
 
st 1

+ (1  ) kj
 
st 1
i
kl
 
st

= kb
 
st
  h
l
n
 
st

kh
 
st

= kb
 
st

+ n
 
st

Here, n (st) are resources given to (or taken from) each high-risk production technology,
and h
l
n (st) are resources taken away from (or given to) each low-risk technology. Resources
ow towards intermediaries who are expected to be more productive, i.e., high-risk interme-
diaries during expansion periods and low-risk intermediaries during contractions.
2.7 Government Policies
The government is a consolidated monetary and nancial authority. The governments ob-
jective is to nd policies that maximize household welfare. Such policies implement the social
optimum as a competitive equilibrium. By implementation we mean nding the interest rate
policy, 1=p (st), the regulatory bounds, CAP (st) or LEV (st), and the prot tax,  (st), such
that the allocations in the competitive equilibriumwith

1=p (st) ; CAP (st) ; LEV (st) ;  (st)
	
coincide with those from the social planners problem. Since the monetary and nancial au-
thority have the common goal of maximizing the welfare of households, the interest rate
policy and nancial regulations are interdependent.
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3 Results from a Simplied Version of the Model
In this section, we consider a simplied version of our full model from Section 2, which
allows us to derive analytically the policies that implement the social optimum. Moreover,
we discuss implications for the full model:
Assumptions A1 : (i) The aggregate productivity shock, st, is i.i.d. The probability of the
good aggregate state, s, is  and the probability of the bad aggregate state, s, is 1 .
(ii) Households are risk neutral. (iii) Depreciation is full,  = 1. (iv) There is no xed
factor in nancial intermediariesproduction,  = 0. (v) Productivity levels satisfy
qh (s) > ql (s) = ql (s) > qh (s). Moreover, high-risk projects have higher expected
productivity than low-risk projects, qh (s) + (1  ) qh (s) > ql (s) = ql (s).
Proposition 1 shows that bankruptcy may occur in equilibrium. Intermediaries declare
bankruptcy if they are unable to pay the promised rate of return to depositors.
Proposition 1 Under assumption A1 (v), in a competitive equilibrium with an active in-
terbank market, either there is no bankruptcy, or only high-risk intermediaries are bankrupt
in a bad aggregate state.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The policies that implement the social optimum depend on whether or not there is
bankruptcy in the competitive equilibrium. We analyze these two cases separately.
Proposition 2 characterizes the policies that implement the social optimum as a compet-
itive equilibrium with no bankruptcy and highlights some equilibrium properties.
Proposition 2 Under assumptions A1, if the allocation in a competitive equilibrium with
no bankruptcy coincides with the social planners allocation, then (i) the capital and lever-
age regulations do not bind, (ii) the interest rate policy is 1
p(st)
= 1

and (iii) the tax on
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intermediaries prots is zero. In addition, (iv) the collateral constraints of intermedi-
aries do not bind and (v) the intermediariesequity to risky capital ratio satises:
z(st)
k(st)
>
1 

 qh(s)
qh(s)
+ 1  
 1
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 shows that, if equity is high enough, the moral hazard of nancial inter-
mediaries is reduced and there is no bankruptcy, as most of the intermediaries liabilities
are state-contingent. As a result, the social optimum can be implemented with a single and
unique policy tool, the interest rate  1, while nancial regulations or taxes are not needed.
Moreover, since high equity reduces intermediariesrisk taking incentives, only a subset of
bonds are traded in the interbank market (i.e. collateral constraints are slack).
When we calibrate our full model from Section 2 to match nancial intermediariesequity
levels observed in U.S. data, the model features bankruptcy. Proposition 3 characterizes the
policies that implement the social optimum as a competitive equilibrium with bankruptcy of
high-risk intermediaries, and shows that the collateral constraint of high-risk intermediaries
binds to restrict risk taking.
Proposition 3 Under assumptions A1, di¤erent combinations of policies implement the so-
cial optimum as a competitive equilibrium with bankruptcy. First, binding capital regulation,
interest rate policy 1
p(st)
< 1

, and prot taxes  (st)  0 implement the social optimum. Alter-
natively, binding leverage regulation, interest rate policy 1
p(st)
= 1

, and prot taxes  (st)  0
implement the social optimum. In either case, there is a trade-o¤ between taxes and nan-
cial regulations. Implementations with positive taxes allow for smaller nancial regulatory
bounds, i.e., CAP (st) or LEV (st), than implementations with zero taxes. Moreover, in
these competitive equilibria, the collateral constraint of high-risk intermediaries binds.
Proof. See Appendix A.
There are several important implications from Proposition 3. First, either binding capital
regulation or binding leverage regulation are necessary to reduce the moral hazard of high-
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risk intermediaries and to implement the social optimum in a competitive equilibrium with
bankruptcy.18 Second, taxes are not needed to implement the social optimum, but if used,
they allow for looser nancial regulation constraints. Indeed, in the proof of Proposition 3, we
show that the social optimum can be implemented with interest rate policy and combinations
of prot taxes and nancial regulations that satisfy equation (5):
1
1   (st) = Q
i
1 +Q
i
2
1
i (st)
, i 2 fCAP;LEV g (5)
where the coe¢ cients Qi1, Q
i
2 for i 2 fCAP;LEV g are functions of parameters ; ; j; qj (s)
and qj (s) for j 2 fh; lg.19 Since Qi1 > 0, Qi2 > 0, for i 2 fCAP;LEV g, it is easy to show
that higher taxes lower the nancial regulatory bounds, i.e.,
@CAP (st)
@(st)
< 0 and
@LEV (st)
@(st)
< 0.
Moreover, Proposition 3 shows that implementing the social optimum in a competitive
equilibrium with bankruptcy requires that the high-risk intermediariescollateral constraint
binds to restrict risk taking via the interbank market. In contrast, in Proposition 2, high
levels of equity provide high-risk intermediaries with incentives to not go bankrupt and to
choose the socially optimal portfolio.
Lastly, Proposition 3 shows that the optimal interest rate policy varies with the nancial
regulation in place. In particular, interest rates are lower under capital regulation than
under leverage regulation. To understand this result, note that under assumptions A1, the
interbank market bond return, 1=~p (st) which inuences the composition of intermediaries
portfolios after repo trades is equated with  1, the expected return on investments in the
social planners problem. When the social optimum is implemented with binding capital
regulation, the equilibrium bond return is lower than the interbank market bond return,
i.e., 1=p (st) < 1=~p (st), because bonds have liquidity attributes, as they can be traded in
18The proof of Proposition 3 shows that if bankruptcy is possible at time t, then nancial regulation binds
at t  1. We conjecture that regulation binds in expansions, because the aggregate state may switch, leading
high-risk intermediaries to default. We conrm this conjecture in our quantitative analysis (Section 4).
19The proof of Proposition 3 shows that: QLEV1 = l+h
qh(s)
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) , Q
LEV
2 =
h(1 )[qh(s) qh(s)]
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) ,
QCAP1 = l + h and Q
CAP
2 = h (1  ) [qh (s)  qh (s)] [qh(s)+(1 )qh(s)]

1 P
j j [qj(s)+(1 )qj(s)]
1
1 
.
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the interbank market and they directly change the capital position of intermediaries. In
contrast, when the social optimum is implemented with leverage regulation, bonds cannot
be used to relax the binding leverage constraint and the equilibrium bond return is set equal
to the interbank market return, i.e., 1=p (st) = 1=~p (st). To sum up, interest rate policy is
 1 if the social optimum is implemented with leverage regulation, or less than  1 if it is
implemented with capital regulation (for analytical details, see the proof of Proposition 3).
4 Quantitative Analysis
We calibrate the model to match key features of the U.S. economy and its nancial sector.
We solve the model numerically and characterize the policies that implement the social
optimum in our decentralized economy. We then perform experiments to quantify the impact
of deviating from the optimal policies on intermediariesrisk taking and the macroeconomy.
We dene risk taking as the percentage deviation in the resources invested in the high-
risk projects in a competitive equilibrium, i.e., kCEh (s
t), relative to the social planner, i.e.,
kSPh (s
t). Formally, r (st) =
kCEh (st) kSPh (st)
kSPh (s
t)
 100, where a positive value of r (st) indicates
excessive risk taking in the competitive equilibrium, while a negative value indicates too little
risk taking. We also report an aggregate measure of risk taking, dened as an average over
expansions and contractions, i.e., r  E [r (st)]. To quantify the macroeconomic impact of
suboptimal policies, we use a standard welfare measure, the lifetime consumption equivalent
(LTCE), dened as the percentage decrease in the planners consumption required to give
consumers the same welfare as the consumption from the competitive equilibrium.
4.1 Calibration
We parameterize the model to the U.S. economy, similar to CSU. Specically, we identify our
models total output with the U.S. business sector value added and our models nonnancial
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sector with the U.S. corporate nonnancial sector.20
Table 1 reports the calibrated discount factor, , the capital share, , the aggregate
shock transition matrix, , and the fraction of high-risk intermediaries, h. The high-risk
intermediaries are taken to be brokers and dealers, who undertook signicant risks prior to
the recent nancial crisis (Adrian and Shin (2010), Rosengren (2014)).
The remaining parameters, Q  fm; ; ; qh (s) ; qm (s) ; qm (s) ; ql (s) ; ql (s)g, are jointly
estimated to match eight U.S. data moments using problem (P3). Table 2 reports the
estimated parameters in panel A and the matched moments in panel B.
Q = argmin
Q
8X
i=1
 

i   ~
i
~
i
!2
(P3)
s.t. : qh (s) < qm (s) < ql (s)  ql (s) < qm (s)  qh (s) = 1 and

i is implied in a competitive equilibrium, given policies ,
where 
 
st 1
  p  st 1 ; CAP = 0:08; LEV = 0;  = 0	
In problem (P3), 
i is a model moment, ~
i is the corresponding data moment, and
the productivity parameters are ordered as discussed in Section 2, with the productivity of
the high-risk intermediary in the good aggregate state normalized to unity. Moreover, the
policies are given in  (st 1), where the values for CAP , LEV , and  are set to capture the
20We treat the remainder of the U.S. business sector (the corporate nancial and the noncorporate busi-
nesses) as the models nancial intermediation sector. In U.S. data, noncorporate businesses are strongly
dependent on the nancial sector for funding. In the past three decades, bank loans and mortgages were 60
to 80 percent of noncorporate businessesliabilities. For simplicity, we do not model these loans, and assume
that intermediaries are endowed with the production technology of noncorporate businesses.
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Basel II capital regulation, and where p (st 1) solves problem (P4).21
p
 
st 1

= arg max
p(st 1)
1X
t=0
X
st
t'
 
st

logC
 
st

(P4)
s.t.: C
 
st

is part of a competitive equilibrium given parameters Q,
and policies 
 
st 1

=

p
 
st 1

; CAP = 0:08; LEV = 0;  = 0
	
Table 2 shows that the model matches the data moments well. The rst three data
moments pin down m,  and , respectively. We note that  is chosen so that our models
stochastic depreciation rate,
mqm;tkm;t+(1 m)(hqh;tkh;t+lql;tkl;t)
mkm;t+(1 m)(hkh;t+lkl;t)
, matches the data. The
remaining moments help pin down the productivity parameters. Note that low-risk projects
are estimated to be virtually riskless, while high-risk projects have a large variance of returns.
This suggests that the moral hazard problem is important for high-risk intermediaries.
4.2 Analytical Results and Simulations from the Full Model
We show analytically that di¤erent combinations of policies i.e., either

1
p
; CAP ; 

or
1
p
; LEV ; 

 implement the social optimum as a competitive equilibrium. We simulate the
model and discuss the key characteristics of the policies. Lastly, we vary the regulatory
ratios, CAP or LEV , and the tax rate away from their optimal levels and evaluate the
impact on intermediariesbalance sheets, on risk taking and welfare.22
We solve the model numerically using Carroll (2006)s endogenous grid method with
occasionally binding nonlinear constraints due to the limited liability of intermediaries and
the possibility of a constrained interbank market or binding nancial regulation constraints.
21Solving problem (P3) involves a two-step procedure as in CSU, because the model is nonlinear and the
initial guess is very important in nding a competitive equilibrium. Given CAP = 8%, LEV = 0,  = 0, an
initial set of parameter values, call it Q1, and an initial guess for our competitive equilibrium allocation (e.g.
the social planner allocation), we nd the optimal bond price, p1, that solves problem (P4). Then, given p

1,
we nd Q2 that solves problem (P3). We continue this iterative process until convergence is achieved.
22Deviations from the optimal interest rate policy were analyzed in detail in CSU, in a model without
nancial regulations.
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4.2.1 Implementing the Social Optimum with Capital or Leverage Regulation
We construct prices, asset returns and policies that implement the socially optimal allocation
as a competitive equilibrium. The social optimum can be implemented with interest rate
policy, capital regulation and prot taxes,

1
p
; CAP ; 

. We refer to this implementation as
the optimal CAP experiment. Alternatively, the optimal LEV experiment implements the
social optimum with interest rate policy, leverage regulation and prot taxes,

1
p
; LEV ; 

.
Propositions 4 and 5 present some analytical results of these two implementations under
specic assumptions regarding the bankruptcy of intermediaries.23 Subsequently, we use
numerical simulations to conrm the bankruptcy patterns assumed in the propositions, and
to discuss the key characteristics of the policies. The parameters used in our numerical
simulations are those from Tables 1 and 2, while the nancial regulation bounds, CAP or
LEV , and the tax rate,  , are constructed to implement the social optimum.
Implementing the social optimum requires nancial regulations to bind in expansions
(Proposition 4), but not in recessions (Proposition 5). Moreover, there is a trade-o¤ between
the tax rate and the regulatory bounds that implement the social optimum (Proposition 4).
Proposition 4 Let the aggregate state at t be st = s. Assume that if st+1 = s, the high-
risk intermediaries are bankrupt at t+ 1. Implementing the social optimum requires that (i)
nancial regulations bind at t, and (ii) the nancial regulation bounds and the tax rate satisfy:
1
1   (stjst = s) = Q
i
1
 
st

+Qi2
 
st
 1
i (stjst = s) , i 2 fCAP;LEV g (6)
where the coe¢ cients Qi1 (s
t) ; Qi2 (s
t) for i 2 fCAP;LEV g are functions of the social plan-
ners allocations and parameters ; ; ; ;; j; qj (s) and qj (s) for j 2 fh; lg.
Proof. See Appendix A.
23For high productivity states, i.e. st = s, it is possible to analytically derive all prices and asset
returns that implement the social optimum as a competitive equilibrium. These details are not included in
Proposition 4, but are available upon request from the authors.
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Proposition 5 Let the aggregate state at t be st = s. Assume that no intermediary is
bankrupt at t+1 for any realization of st+1 2 fs; sg. Then, nancial regulations do not bind
at t in implementations of the social optimum.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In what follows, we present results from the optimal CAP and optimal LEV experiments
the two implementations we consider for a sequence of 100 draws of the aggregate shock.
We discuss the features of the policies that implement the social optimum, including the
trade-o¤s between the nancial regulation bounds and the tax rate implied by equation (6).
Figure 2 plots the policies that implement the social optimum: either

1
p
,CAP ,

in the
optimal CAP experiment, or

1
p
,LEV ,

in the optimal LEV experiment. The net annual-
ized interest rate policy, i.e., 100  (1=p)4   1, is procyclical (upper left subplot in Figure 2)
and depends on the nancial regulations in place. Specically, during booms, interest rates
in the optimal CAP experiment are 1:9 percentage points lower, on average, than in the
optimal LEV experiment. During recessions, the interest rates in the two implementations
are equal. The intuition for these results is the same as in the simple model of Section
3. The interbank market bond returns, 1=~p, in the two experiments are equated with the
expected return on investments in the social optimum. Under binding leverage regulation,
the bond return, 1=p, is equal to 1=~p. However, binding capital regulation during booms
alters the composition of intermediariesassets and lowers the bond return relative to the
the interbank market bond return.
Unlike interest rate policy, the nancial regulations and tax rates that implement the
social optimum are not unique, as shown in Proposition 4. The state-dependent nature of
the coe¢ cients in equation (6) implies that either the prot tax rate,  , or the regulatory
bounds, CAP or LEV , must also depend on the models state variables: household wealth,
wt, and aggregate productivity, st. In implementing the social optimum, we restrict the prot
tax rate to vary only with aggregate productivity and let the regulatory bounds absorb any
variation in wealth (i.e., compute CAP (wt; st = s) or LEV (wt; st = s) from (6)).
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Specically, we set  (s) = 0:0361 to obtain an average minimum regulatory capital of 10:5
percent during high productivity periods, consistent with the Basel III regulation currently
implemented in many countries (upper right subplot in Figure 2). We set the tax rate for
the low productivity periods to  (s) = 0:0007 to minimize the business cycle variation in
the intermediariesequity to risky capital ratio, i.e., z=k, in the implementation with capital
regulation. We keep tax rates at the same level when implementing the social optimum with
leverage regulation, and then back out LEV (wt; st = s) from equation (6).
Figure 2 plots the minimum regulatory capital necessary to implement the social optimum
and the actual equity to risky capital ratio in the optimal CAP experiment (lower left
subplot), as well as the actual and the minimum required equity to deposit ratio in the
optimal LEV experiment (lower right subplot). Note that our model calls for nancial
regulation constraints to be relaxed during recessions. Since nancial regulations only bind
in high productivity periods, we exogenously set the required regulatory ratios to zero in low
productivity periods.24 Although we allow the regulatory bounds computed from equation
(6) to vary with household wealth, the numerical results show that, during high productivity
periods when wealth increases, CAP (wt; st = s) and LEV (wt; st = s) are at. This result
is desirable from a policymakers perspective, since regulations that are independent of the
models endogenous state variable (i.e., wealth) are easier to implement in practice.
Figure 3 compares simulation results from the optimal CAP and the optimal LEV exper-
iments, for a sequence of 100 draws of the aggregate state. One important di¤erence between
the two implementations is that equity constitutes a larger fraction of total liabilities un-
der optimal leverage regulation than under optimal capital regulation (upper right subplot).
Since the fraction of assets invested in risky projects is the same across the two experiments
(middle right subplot), the capital regulation constraint from the optimal CAP experiment
is satised under the optimal LEV experiment. Thus, optimal leverage regulation imposes
a stricter requirement on equity compared to optimal capital regulation, allowing the imple-
24Alternatively, the required capital can be set to 8 percent or any lower number, as it would not bind.
27
mentation of the social optimum without explicit restrictions on the composition of assets.
A second di¤erence between the optimal CAP and optimal LEV experiments is that the
spread between the deposit rate and the government bond rate is positive in high productiv-
ity periods under optimal capital regulation, whereas it is always zero under optimal leverage
regulation (lower right subplot). The positive spread is driven by di¤erences in the bond
rates across the two experiments; deposit rates are identical because they are linked to the
expected return on investments in the social planners problem (lower left subplot).
4.2.2 Variations in the Optimal Policies
We vary the nancial regulatory bounds and the tax rates away from their optimal levels and
evaluate the impact on the balance sheet composition of intermediaries, on asset returns, risk
taking and welfare. Moreover, we use these numerical experiments to highlight similarities
and di¤erences between capital and leverage regulation.
Tables 3 and 4 report results from several experiments. The benchmark labelled exper-
iment 1 in the tables is the economy calibrated as in Section 4:1, where the interest rate
policy is chosen optimally, and CAP = 0:08; LEV = 0;  = 0 in line with the Basel II capital
regulation. The optimal CAP and the optimal LEV experiments labelled experiments 2
and 3 in the tables are the two implementations of the social optimum discussed in Section
4:2:1. In addition, we conduct experiments in which we change the nancial policies rela-
tive to the optimal CAP or optimal LEV experiments, while keeping the other policies at
their optimal levels. For example, we keep 1
p
and  as in the optimal CAP experiment, but
change the minimum regulatory capital, CAP , to 1 percent (experiment 2a) or 25 percent
(experiment 2b). Or, we keep 1
p
and CAP as in the optimal CAP experiment, but set taxes,
 , to zero (experiment 2c). Analogously, we change LEV to either 1 percent or 20 percent
in experiments 3a and 3b, and set taxes to zero in experiment 3c.
Table 3 reports the intermediariesbalance sheet composition before and after interbank
market repo trades. Compared with the benchmark which is calibrated to match an average
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equity to asset ratio of 19 percent the optimal CAP and optimal LEV experiments have
lower equity to asset ratios, due to the incorporation of prot taxes in the optimal toolkit.
Indeed, experiments 2c and 3c with zero taxes have equity to asset ratios comparable to
those in the benchmark economy. Although the initial asset composition of intermediaries
varies across experiments, once repo trades take place, high-risk intermediaries invest a
fairly constant fraction of their balance sheet in risky assets, i.e., kh= (z + d) is on average
84 percent in all experiments. Thus, the total resources allocated to high-risk investments,
kh, and risk taking relative to the social planner depend on the size of the balance sheet.
We investigate our numerical results further by changing one nancial policy tool at a
time (i.e., either CAP or ) away from its level in the optimal CAP experiment. Lowering
the minimum regulatory capital to 1 percent in experiment 2a allows intermediaries to hold
less equity, about 2 percent of liabilities, compared to about 8 percent in the optimal CAP
experiment (Table 3). Given more deposits, the moral hazard of intermediaries is more
pronounced and risk taking is about 1:8 percent higher relative to the social optimum (Table
4). Similarly, raising the minimum regulatory capital to 25 percent in experiment 2b causes
welfare losses since risk taking is now 3:4 percent lower relative to the social optimum.
Lastly, eliminating the prot tax in experiment 2c raises the returns to equity and the
amount of equity on intermediariesbalance sheet. Risk taking, welfare and the balance
sheet composition of intermediaries are similar to those in the benchmark (Tables 3 and 4).
Next, we establish similarities and di¤erences between capital and leverage regulations.
A rst di¤erence between the nancial policies is that changes in leverage regulation away
from its optimal level have stronger e¤ects on risk taking and welfare than do changes
in capital regulation. To establish this result, we compare two sets of experiments. In
experiments 2a and 3a, we choose CAP and LEV so that equity represents about 2 percent
of the intermediariesbalance sheet. In experiments 2b and 3b, we choose CAP and LEV
so that equity represents about 15 percent of intermediariesbalance sheet. In each pair
of experiments, it is important to keep the equity share comparable, since equity directly
29
a¤ects the moral hazard of intermediaries. Table 4 shows that bond returns under leverage
regulation are higher than under capital regulation. In experiment 3a, the higher bond
returns lead intermediaries to expand their balance sheet and increase risk taking relative
to experiment 2a. To understand why, we rewrite the balance sheet of the nancial sector
as Z + D = Z + Dh + Dg = Z + Dh + pB. Equity and household deposits (not shown
in Table 3) are comparable across experiments 2a and 3a. However, the higher returns
under leverage regulation lead to a higher pB, and thus an expansion of the balance sheet
and the total resources allocated to high-risk investments, kh. Risk taking is 59 percent
higher than the optimum in experiment 3a and only 1:8 percent higher in experiment 2a
(Table 4). In contrast, in experiment 3b, despite higher bond returns intermediaries purchase
fewer bonds than in experiment 2b. The reason is that government seigniorage from bond
issuance, RdDg   B =
 
Rd   1=p pB, is negative in experiment 3b because Rd   1=p is
negative (Table 4). Bond purchases, the balance sheet of intermediaries and risk taking are
all lower in experiment 3b than in 2b:
A second di¤erence between the nancial policies is that lowering taxes to zero has
stronger e¤ects on risk taking and welfare in the presence of leverage regulation (experiment
3c) than in the presence of capital regulation (experiment 2c). The intuition is comparable
to that of experiments 2a and 3a. Namely, under leverage regulation (experiment 3c), bond
returns are higher and intermediaries buy more bonds, have larger balance sheets and engage
in more risk taking than under capital regulation (experiment 2c).
To show that the results in Tables 3 and 4 hold more generally, we consider a wide range
of variations in CAP and LEV relative to their levels in the optimal CAP or optimal LEV
experiments. Figure 4 reports welfare and risk taking relative to the social planner from
experiments where the value of the capital regulation bound, CAP , varies from 1 percent to
99 percent, while interest rate policy and taxes are maintained at their optimal CAP levels.
Similarly, we perform experiments where LEV varies from 1 percent to 25 percent which
corresponds to an increase in intermediariesdeposit to equity ratio (i.e., leverage) between
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4 and 100 while interest rate policy and taxes are maintained at their optimal LEV levels.
The left subplots in Figure 4 show that small variations in CAP around its Basel III
level of 10:5 percent have a small impact on risk taking and welfare. However, consistent
with previous literature, large increases in CAP are very costly (Van den Heuvel (2009)).
The right plots in Figure 4 show that changing the leverage regulation has a bigger impact
on risk taking than changing the capital regulation, while the magnitude of welfare losses is
considerably smaller. As expected, looser leverage constraints (e.g. LEV around 1 percent,
or leverage around 100) increase intermediariesrisk taking.
We conclude that changing nancial policies away from their optimal levels a¤ects the
bond return, 1
p
, government seigniorage,
 
Rd   1=p pB, and the size of intermediariesbal-
ance sheet. Since intermediaries invest a fairly constant fraction of their balance sheet in
risky projects, the size of the balance sheet ultimately determines risk taking and welfare
relative to the social planner.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a model in which nancial intermediariesrisky investments (i.e.,
risk taking) over the business cycle may exceed the social optimum owing to limited liability
and deposit insurance. Our main contribution is to characterize optimal policies that achieve
e¢ cient risk taking when the model is calibrated to the U.S. economy.
We show that the social optimum can be implemented in our calibrated economy either
with (i) interest rate policy, capital regulation and prot taxes, or with (ii) interest rate
policy, leverage regulation and prot taxes. Our models monetary and nancial authorities
are consolidated and have the goal of maximizing householdswelfare. As a result, the
optimal policies are interdependent. First, the level of interest rates depends on the nancial
regulation in place. Specically, bond rates are higher in the implementation with leverage
regulation because capital regulation distorts the equilibrium bond return, as it directly
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a¤ects the asset composition of intermediaries. Second, there is a trade-o¤ between prot
taxes and the nancial regulatory bounds. Lower taxes require tighter nancial regulation
constraints in order to implement the social optimum.
There are other interesting results regarding the optimal policies. Namely, all policies are
countercyclical. Interest rates are higher during expansions; capital and leverage regulations
bind in expansions and are relaxed during contractions; taxes are higher during expansions
when moral hazard is elevated and intermediaries have incentives to engage in excessive risk
taking. In addition, optimal leverage regulation imposes a stricter requirement on equity
than the optimal capital regulation, allowing the implementation of the social optimum
without explicit restrictions on the composition of assets of nancial intermediaries.
We conduct additional experiments to evaluate the impact of deviating from the optimal
policies. We nd that variations in the capital requirement in the range contemplated by
policymakers have a small impact on risk taking in the economy. However, variations in
leverage regulation have a stronger impact on risk taking relative to comparable experiments
with capital regulation, since bond returns are higher under leverage regulation. We conclude
that leverage regulation is a promising alternative for controlling excessive risk taking of
intermediaries, since it is easier to implement in practice compared to capital regulation,
which requires assessing the riskiness of all assets on an intermediarys balance sheet.
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A Appendix: Proofs
To simplify notation in our derivations, we use subscript t   1 as short-hand notation for
dependence on history st 1. For example, we dene dt 1  d(st 1) and ~bj;t 1  ~bj(st 1).
Moreover, we dene qj;t  qj (st) but note that productivity depends only on the current
realization of the aggregate shock.
Proof of Proposition 1.
In an interior competitive equilibrium, expected returns on deposits are positive and
equal to the expected returns on nancial equity (i.e., expected prots per unit of equity).
Rdt 1
P
stjst 1
t =
P
stjst 1
tR
z
t =
P
stjst 1
t
1  t 1
zt 1
[hVh;t + lVl;t] > 0
Thus, some intermediary j makes strictly positive prots for some aggregate state st.
Using the result that wage rates equal the marginal product of labor and that lj;t = 1 in
equilibrium, equation (2) can be written as in equation (A:1), where notice that all variables
except for qj;t depend on the shock from t  1.
Vj;t = max
("
( + ) qj;t

kt 1 + ~pt 1~bj;t 1

+ qj;t (1  )

kt 1 + ~pt 1~bj;t 1

+bt 1   ~bj;t 1  Rdt 1dt 1
#
; 0
)
(A.1)
The ranking of productivity levels and equation (A:1) imply that prots in a good state
are at least as big as prots in a bad state: Vh;t (s) > Vh;t (s) and Vl;t (s) = Vl;t (s). Let Ij;t
be an indicator function that equals 1 if intermediary js gross prot, i.e., the term in the
square bracket in equation (A:1), is positive. Then, either Ih;t (s) = 1 or Il;t (s) = 1 or both.
If low-risk intermediaries default in both states, there are no trades in the interbank market.
We rule out this uninteresting case. It follows that, at least in the good aggregate state,
there is no default: Ih;t (s) = Il;t (s) = 1. Since Vl;t (s) = Vl;t (s), the low-risk intermediary
does not default in the bad state, Ih;t (s) = Il;t (s) = Il;t (s) = 1 for all t. Lastly, in a bad
aggregate state, high-risk intermediaries may either default, or not, Ih;t (s) 2 f0; 1g.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) Let superscript SP index variables that pertain to the social planners problem. If
the competitive equilibrium allocation coincides with the social optimum then: Ct = CSPt ,
kj;t 1 = kt 1 + ~pt 1~bj;t 1 = kSPj;t 1 for j 2 fh; lg, and km;t 1 = kSPm;t 1. Comparing rst order
conditions in the two environments, we nd t = 
SP
t , as well as equation (A:2).
t 1 = Rdt 1
P
stjst 1
t = 
P
stjst 1
SPt qj;t (kj;t 1)
 1 = SPt 1 for j 2 fh; lg
0 =
P
stjst 1
SPt
h
qj;t
 
kSPj;t 1
 1  Rdt 1i for j 2 fh; lg (A.2)
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Dividing by SPt 1 and using
SPt
SPt 1
= t
t 1
= ' (stjst 1) = ' (st), equation (A:2) becomes:
0 =
P
stjst 1
' (st)
h
qj;t
 
kSPj;t 1
 1  Rdt 1i for j 2 fh; lg (A.3)
Using t = 
SP
t , kj;t 1 = k
SP
j;t 1 and the assumption that there is no bankruptcy in the
competitive equilibrium, i.e., Ij (st) = 1 for all j and for all st, an intermediarys rst order
condition with respect to dt 1 becomes:
(1   t 1) 
P
j2fh;lg
j
P
stjst 1
SPt
h
qj;t
 
kSPj;t 1
 1  Rdt 1i = CAPt 1 CAPt 1 + LEVt 1 LEVt 1 (A.4)
Comparing (A:2) and (A:4), it follows that an equilibrium implements the planners
allocation if CAPt 1 
CAP
t 1 +
LEV
t 1 
LEV
t 1 = 0. Since 
CAP
t 1  0, CAPt 1  0, LEVt 1  0 and LEVt 1  0,
it follows that either the capital and leverage regulations are absent CAPt 1 = 
LEV
t 1 = 0

or
they do not bind
 
CAPt 1 = 
LEV
t 1 = 0

.
(ii) First, we show that in a competitive equilibrium in which capital regulation does not
bind, the bond returns on the primary and the interbank market are equal, i.e., 1
pt 1
= 1
~pt 1
.
The rst order condition with respect to bt 1 is:
(1   t 1)

1  ~pt 1
pt 1

 t   CAPt 1 CAPt 1 = 0 (A.5)
where t 
P
j2fh;lg j
P
stjst 1
t
t 1
Ij;tqj;t

zt 1 + dt 1   pt 1bt 1 + ~pt 1~bj;t 1
 1
. Note
that t > 0, because not all intermediaries are bankrupt in equilibrium. Moreover,  t 1 2
[0; 1). As a result, in the absence of capital regulation
 
CAPt 1 = 0

, or if this regulation does
not bind
 
CAPt 1 = 0

, the primary and interbank market bond prices are equated, pt 1 = ~pt 1.
In particular, since LEVt 1 does not enter equation (A:5), leverage regulation doesnt drive a
wedge between pt 1 and ~pt 1.
Next, we show that to implement the social optimum as a competitive equilibrium, the
return on deposits and the interbank market bond return must satisfy, Rdt 1 =
1
~pt 1
.
The assumption that high-risk intermediaries have higher expected productivity (see
assumption A1 (v)) means that low-risk intermediaries purchase bonds on the interbank
market. Thus, ~bl;t 1 < 0 < bt 1 and the complimentary slackness conditions imply that the
collateral constraint does not bind for low-risk intermediaries, i.e. l;t 1 = 0. Then, the rst
order condition with respect to ~bl;t 1 becomes:
1  t 1
SPt 1
P
stjst 1
SPt
h
ql;t
 
kSPl;t 1
 1   1
~pt 1
i
= 0 (A.6)
where we have used t = 
SP
t , kl;t = k
SP
l;t and Il;t  Il (st) = 1 for all st.
Combining (A:2) and (A:6) gives Rdt 1 =
1
~pt 1
. We have shown that Rdt 1 =
1
~pt 1
= 1
pt 1
.
Under assumptions A1, the householdsrst order conditions give Rdt 1 =
1

. Thus, 1
pt 1
= 1

.
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(iii) In an interior competitive equilibrium, expected returns on deposits are equal to the
expected returns on nancial equity (i.e., expected prots per unit of equity).
Rdt 1
P
stjst 1
t =
P
stjst 1
t
1  t 1
zt 1
[hVh;t + lVl;t]
Rdt 1
P
stjst 1
t =
P
stjst 1
t
1  t 1
zt 1

hqh;tk

h;t 1 + lql;tk

l;t 1 + bt 1  Rdt 1dt 1

To obtain the last equation, we used the denition of Vj;t, the fact that h + l = 1, as
well as the market clearing condition h~bh;t 1 + l~bl;t 1 = 0. Rearranging terms, we nd:
zt 1
1  t 1 + dt 1

Rdt 1
P
stjst 1
t =
P
stjst 1
t
 P
j2fh;lg
jqj;tk

j;t 1
!
+ bt 1
P
stjst 1
t
Next, use equation (A:2), that is: Rdt 1
P
stjst 1
t =
P
stjst 1
tqj;tk
 1
j;t 1, to write:
(hkh;t 1 + lkl;t 1)Rdt 1
P
stjst 1
t = h
P
stjst 1
tqh;tk

h;t 1 + l
P
stjst 1
tql;tk

l;t 1
Thus, we nd:
zt 1
1  t 1 + dt 1

Rdt 1
P
stjst 1
t = (hkh;t 1 + lkl;t 1)Rdt 1
P
stjst 1
t + bt 1
P
stjst 1
t
zt 1
1  t 1 + dt 1 = hkh;t 1 + lkl;t 1 +
1
Rdt 1
bt 1
As shown in (ii), to implement the social optimum as a competitive equilibrium, it must
be that Rdt 1 =
1
~pt 1
. Moreover, as shown in (ii), when capital and leverage regulations do not
bind, bond prices satisfy 1
~pt 1
= 1
pt 1
. Thus, we get zt 1
1  t 1+dt 1 = hkh;t 1+lkl;t 1+pt 1bt 1.
Moreover, hkh;t 1 + lkl;t 1 = kt 1. Aggregating kt 1 + pt 1bt 1 = zt 1 + dt 1 yields
(1  m) kt 1 + pt 1Bt 1 = Zt 1 +Dh;t 1 +Dg;t 1, or (1  m) kt 1 = Zt 1 +Dh;t 1 and so:
zt 1
1  t 1 + dt 1 = kt 1 + pt 1bt 1 =
Zt 1+Dh;t 1
1 m +
pt 1Bt 1
1 m =
Zt 1+Dh;t 1+Dg;t 1
1 m = zt 1 + dt 1
Thus,  t 1 = 0.
(iv) Using equation (A:2) for j 2 fh; lg, we ndP
stjst 1
SPt qh;t
 
kSPh;t 1
 1
=
P
stjst 1
SPt ql;t
 
kSPl;t 1
 1
As a result, equation (A:6) becomes (A:7).
1  t 1
SPt 1
P
stjst 1
SPt
h
qh;t
 
kSPh;t 1
 1   1
~pt 1
i
= 0 (A.7)
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The rst order condition with respect to ~bh;t 1 is (A:8).
(1   t 1)
P
stjst 1
t
t 1
h
~pt 1qh;t (kh;t 1)
 1   1
i
= h;t 1 (A.8)
Since t = 
SP
t and kh;t 1 = k
SP
h;t 1, equations (A:7) and (A:8) imply that h;t 1 = 0.
As shown in (ii) we also have l;t 1 = 0, and thus the collateral constraints of the nancial
intermediaries do not bind.
(v) It is su¢ cient to derive conditions under which high-risk intermediaries do not go
bankrupt in the event of a bad aggregate state. Then, as argued in Proposition 1, no
intermediary goes bankrupt, i.e., Ij (st) = 1 for all j 2 fh; lg and for all st 2 fs; sg.
Using equation (2), the condition Vh;t  0 is equivalent to qh;tkh;t 1+ bt 1  1~pt 1 (kh;t 1 
kt 1) Rdt 1dt 1  0, where we have used the fact that kh;t 1 = kt 1+ ~pt 1~bh;t 1. Let xt 1 be
the fraction of resources an intermediary retains for risky investments in the primary market
portfolio decision. Namely, kt 1 = xt 1 (zt 1 + dt 1) and pt 1bt 1 = (1  xt 1) (zt 1 + dt 1).
The no default condition for high-risk intermediaries is:
qh;tk

h;t 1   1~pt 1kh;t 1 + 1pt 1 (1  xt 1) (zt 1 + dt 1) + 1~pt 1xt 1 (zt 1 + dt 1) Rdt 1dt 1  0
(A.9)
As shown in (iv), if a competitive equilibrium with no bankruptcy implements the social
optimum, then ~bj;t 1 < bt 1, and j;t 1 = 0. Moreover, since R
d
t 1 =
1
pt 1
= 1
~pt 1
, equation
(A:9) becomes: qh;tkh;t 1 +R
d
t 1 (zt 1   kh;t 1)  0.
The level of equity at which the high-risk intermediary doesnt go bankrupt is:
zt 1  kh;t 1   1Rdt 1 qh;tk

h;t 1
zt 1  kh;t 1

1  ~pt 1qh;tk 1h;t 1

(A.10)
Assuming no bankruptcy, Ij (st) = 1 for all j and for all st, and using the result that
j;t 1 = 0, the rst order condition with respect to ~bj;t 1 can be written as:
kj;t 1  kt 1 + ~pt 1~bj;t 1 =
24 1
~pt 1

P
stjst 1
t
t 1P
stjst 1
t
t 1 qj;t
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1
 1
=
h
1
~pt 1
 1
qj(s)+(1 )qj(s)
i 1
 1
where we have used t
t 1
= ' (stjst 1) = ' (st) and
P
stjst 1
' (st) = 1.
Equation (A:10) becomes:
zt 1  kh;t 1
h
1  qh(st)
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s)
i
for all st 2 fs; sg (A.11)
Using qh (s) > qh (s), the inequality in (A:11) becomes:
zt 1
kh;t 1
 1  1

qh(s)
qh(s)
+1  .
Since high-risk intermediaries sell bonds on the interbank market, we have kh;t 1 > kt 1
and thus zt 1=kt 1 > zt 1=kh;t 1  1  1

qh(s)
qh(s)
+1  .
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Proof of Proposition 3.
First, we show that either binding capital regulation or binding leverage regulation are
necessary to implement the social optimum as a competitive equilibrium with bankruptcy
of high-risk intermediaries. Let Ij;t be an indicator function which equals 1 if intermediary
j0s gross prot at time t (i.e., the term in the square bracket in equation (A:1)) is positive.
Assume that for some t, Ih;t (s) = 0 and Ih;t (s) = Il;t (s) = Il;t (s) = 1. The rst order
condition with respect to deposits evaluated at the optimal allocation (i.e., using t = 
SP
t
and kj;t 1 = kSPj;t 1) and using
t
t 1
= ' (stjst 1) = ' (st), becomes:
CAPt 1 
CAP
t 1 + 
LEV
t 1 
LEV
t 1 = (1   t 1)h  ' (s)
h
qh (s) 
 
kSPh;t 1
 1  Rdt 1i
+(1   t 1)l 
P
stjst 1
SPt
SPt 1
h
ql;t
 
kSPl;t 1
 1  Rdt 1i
CAPt 1 
CAP
t 1 + 
LEV
t 1 
LEV
t 1 = (1   t 1)h  
h
qh (s) 
 
kSPh;t 1
 1  Rdt 1i (A.12)
where to obtain (A:12) we used (A:2) as well as ' (s) = .
Using (A:2) again for j = h, we can express Rd as below.
Rdt 1 =
P
stjst 1
SPt qh;t(kSPh;t 1)
 1P
stjst 1
SPt
=
P
stjst 1
SPt
SPt 1
qh;t(kSPh;t 1)
 1P
stjst 1
SPt
SPt 1
=
P
stjst 1
' (st) qh;t
 
kSPh;t 1
 1
With this expression for Rdt 1, equation (A:12) simplies further as shown below.
CAPt 1 CAPt 1 +
LEV
t 1 LEVt 1
(1  t 1)h = (1  ) 
 
kSPh;t 1
 1
[qh (s)  qh (s)] > 0
Thus, CAPt 1 
CAP
t 1 + 
LEV
t 1 
LEV
t 1 > 0, which means that to implement the social optimum
in an equilibrium with bankruptcy, either the capital regulation binds
 
CAPt 1 > 0

or the
leverage regulation binds
 
LEVt 1 > 0

, or both.
Next, we show that interest rate policy 1
pt 1
< 1

, binding capital regulation, i.e., zt 1 =
CAPt 1 kt 1, and a prot tax,  t 1  0, implement the social optimum as a competitive equi-
librium with bankruptcy. Moreover, we show there is a trade-o¤ between capital regulation
and taxes, i.e.,
@CAPt 1
@ t 1
< 0. If tax rates are low, the minimum regulatory capital necessary to
implement the social optimum is high.
If capital regulation binds, equation (A:5) implies that 1
pt 1
< 1
~pt 1
. Moreover, the proof
of Proposition 2 shows that in order to implement the social optimum as a competitive
equilibrium, we must have Rdt 1 =
1
~pt 1
= 1

. Thus, with binding capital regulation in place,
the interest rate policy satises 1
pt 1
< 1

.
In an interior equilibrium, expected returns on deposits and nancial equity are equated.
Rdt 1
P
stjst 1
t =
P
stjst 1
tR
z
t =
P
stjst 1
t
1  t 1
zt 1
[hVh;t + lVl;t] > 0
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Dividing both sides by t 1, and using tt 1 = ' (s
tjst 1) = ' (st) and
P
stjst 1
' (st) = 1,
we nd: Rdt 1 =
P
stjst 1
' (st)
1  t 1
zt 1
[hVh;t + lVl;t].
Using Ih (s) = 0 and Ih (s) = Il (s) = Il (s) = 1, ~bh;t 1 = bt 1 and ~bl;t 1 =  hl bt 1, and
evaluating the expression at the optimal allocation (i.e., using kj;t 1 = kSPj;t 1), we nd:
Rdt 1 =
1  t 1
zt 1
 ' (s)h
h
qh (s)
 
kSPh;t 1
  Rdt 1dt 1i (A.13)
+1  t 1
zt 1
 P
stjst 1
' (st)l
h
ql;t
 
kSPl;t 1

+ bt 1
l
 Rdt 1dt 1
i
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, in order to implement the social optimum as a
competitive equilibrium, we must have Rdt 1 =
1
~pt 1
= 1

. Then,
bt 1 =
kh;t 1 kt 1
~pt 1
=
kh;t 1 (hkh;t 1+lkl;t 1)
~pt 1
= Rdt 1l
 
kSPh;t 1   kSPl;t 1

Using (A:2), and the equation above, (A:13) becomes:
zt 1
1  t 1R
d
t 1 = ' (s)h
h
qh (s)
 
kSPh;t 1
  Rdt 1dt 1i+ kSPl;t 1lRdt 1 P
stjst 1
' (st)
+lR
d
t 1
 
kSPh;t 1   kSPl;t 1
 P
stjst 1
' (st)  lRdt 1dt 1
P
stjst 1
' (st)
= ' (s)h
h
qh (s)
 
kSPh;t 1
  Rdt 1dt 1i+ lRdt 1  kSPh;t 1   dt 1
where we have used
P
stjst 1
' (st) = 1. Divide by Rdt 1 =
1

and use ' (s) =  to get:
zt 1
1  t 1 = h
h
qh (s)
 
kSPh;t 1
   dt 1i+ l  kSPh;t 1   dt 1
zt 1
1  t 1 = k
SP
h;t 1
h
hqh (s) 
 
kSPh;t 1
 1
+ l
i
  (h + l) dt 1
Using k1 h;t 1 =  [qh (s) + (1  ) qh (s)] we nd
zt 1
1  t 1 = k
SP
h;t 1
h
h
qh(s)
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) + l
i
  (h + l) dt 1 (A.14)
Using kSPh;t 1 = zt 1 + dt 1 and zt 1 = 
CAP
t 1 kt 1, we nd
CAPt 1 kt 1
1  t 1 = k
SP
h;t 1
h
h
qh(s)
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) + l
i
  (h + l)
 
kSPh;t 1   CAPt 1 kt 1

= kSPh;t 1
h
h
qh(s)
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s)   h
i
+ (h + l) 
CAP
t 1 kt 1
= hk
SP
h;t 1  (1 )[qh(s) qh(s)]qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) + (h + l) 
CAP
t 1 kt 1
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Simplifying, we nd
1
1  t 1 = l + h +
hk
SP
h;t 1
kt 1
 (1 )[qh(s) qh(s)]
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s)
1
CAPt 1
Using k1 j;t 1 =  [qj (s) + (1  ) qj (s)] and also kt 1 = hkh;t 1 + lkl;t 1 we nd
1
1  t 1 = l + h +
(1 )[qh(s) qh(s)]
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) 
h[qh(s)+(1 )qh(s)]
1
1 P
j
j [qj(s)+(1 )qj(s)]
1
1 
 1
CAPt 1
Equivalently, 1
1  t 1 = Q
CAP
1 +Q
CAP
2
1
CAPt 1
, where the coe¢ cients depend on parameters,
QCAP1 = l + h 2 (0; 1) and QCAP2 = h (1  ) [qh (s)  qh (s)]  [qh(s)+(1 )qh(s)]

1 P
j j [qj(s)+(1 )qj(s)]
1
1 
.
Since QCAP1 > 0 and Q
CAP
2 > 0, it is easy to see that
@CAPt 1
@ t 1
< 0. In particular, if taxes are
eliminated, i.e.,  t 1 = 0, the minimum regulatory capital is higher, i.e., CAPt 1 =
QCAP2
1 QCAP1
.
Next, we show that interest rate policy 1
pt 1
= 1

, binding leverage regulation, i.e.,
zt 1 = LEVt 1 dt 1, and a prot tax, i.e.,  t 1  0, implement the social optimum as a compet-
itive equilibrium with bankruptcy. Moreover, we show there is a trade-o¤ between leverage
regulation and taxes, i.e.,
@LEVt 1
@ t 1
< 0. If tax rates are low, the maximum regulatory leverage,
1=LEVt 1 , necessary to implement the social optimum is low.
If leverage regulation binds, equation (A:5) implies that 1
pt 1
= 1
~pt 1
. Moreover, the proof
of Proposition 2 shows that in order to implement the social optimum as a competitive
equilibrium, we must have Rdt 1 =
1
~pt 1
= 1

. Thus, with binding leverage regulation in place,
the interest rate policy satises 1
pt 1
= 1

.
Equation (A:14) becomes:
LEVt 1 dt 1
1  t 1 = k
SP
h;t 1
h
h
qh(s)
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) + l
i
  (h + l) dt 1
Using kSPh;t 1 = zt 1 + dt 1 = 
LEV
t 1 dt 1 + dt 1 and dividing by 
LEV
t 1 dt 1 we nd
1
1  t 1 =
LEVt 1 dt 1+dt 1
LEVt 1 dt 1
h
h
qh(s)
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) + l
i
  (h + l) dt 1LEVt 1 dt 1
=

1 + 1
LEVt 1
 h
h
qh(s)
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) + l
i
  (h + l) 1LEVt 1
= l + h
qh(s)
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) +
h(1 )[qh(s) qh(s)]
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s)
1
LEVt 1
Equivalently, 1
1  t 1 = Q
LEV
1 +Q
LEV
2  1LEVt 1 , where Q
LEV
1 = l + h
qh(s)
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) > 0
and QLEV2 =
h(1 )[qh(s) qh(s)]
qh(s)+(1 )qh(s) > 0. It is easy to see that
@LEVt 1
@ t 1
< 0. In particular, if taxes
are eliminated, i.e.,  t 1 = 0, the maximum regulatory leverage is lower, i.e., 1LEVt 1
=
1 QLEV1
QLEV2
.
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Lastly, we show that the collateral constraint of high-risk intermediaries binds.
Using t
t 1
= ' (stjst 1) = ' (st), Equation (A:7) can be restated as:
~pt 1 =
1

 
kSPh;t 1
 1
[qh (s) + (1  ) qh (s)]
= 
where the result ~pt 1 =  has been shown in the proof of Proposition 2.
Given bankruptcy patterns, i.e. Ih;t (s) = 1 and Ih;t (s) = 0, and using ~pt 1 =  and 
kSPh;t 1
1 
=  [qh (s) + (1  ) qh (s)], the rst order condition for ~bh;t 1 becomes
h;t 1
' (s) (1   t 1) = ~pt 1qh (s) 
 
kSPh;t 1
 1   1 = qh (s)
[qh (s) + (1  ) qh (s)]   1
=
(1  ) [qh (s)  qh (s)]
qh (s) + (1  ) qh (s) > 0
Thus, h;t 1 > 0 which means the collateral constraint of high-risk intermediaries binds.
Proof of Proposition 4.
First, we prove that nancial regulations bind in good aggregate states, i.e., at all t such
that st = s. Given the assumption that high-risk intermediaries are bankrupt at t + 1 if
st+1 = s, the rst order condition with respect to deposits evaluated at the optimal allocation
is similar to equation (A:12) in Proposition 3.
CAPt 
CAP
t +
LEV
t 
LEV
t
(1  t)hSPt+1(s)
= qh (s)
h

 
kSPh;t
 1
+ 1  
i
 Rdt
where SPt+1 (s)  SP (st+1jst+1 = s).
Moreover, similar to Proposition 3, Rdt =
h

 
kSPh;t
 1
+ 1  
i

P
st+1jst
SPt+1qh;t+1P
st+1jst
SPt+1
.
Combining the two equations we nd
CAPt 
CAP
t +
LEV
t 
LEV
t
(1  t)hSPt+1(s)
=
h

 
kSPh;t
 1
+ 1  
i h
qh (s)  
SP
t+1(s)qh(s)+
SP
t+1(s)qh(s)
SPt+1(s)+
SP
t+1(s)
i
=
h

 
kSPh;t
 1
+ 1  
i
SPt+1(s)[qh(s) qh(s)]
SPt+1(s)+
SP
t+1(s)
> 0
Thus, to implement the social optimum in good aggregate states, either the capital
regulation binds
 
CAPt 1 > 0

or the leverage regulation binds
 
LEVt 1 > 0

, or both.
Next, suppose the social optimum in good aggregate states is implemented with binding
capital regulation. Similar to equation (A:13) in Proposition 3, we can show that:
1
1  t =
1
zt
t+1(s)
Rdt
P
st+1jst
t+1
h
n
qh (s)
h
( + ) (kh;t)
 + (1  ) kh;t
i
 Rdt dt
o
+ 1
zt
1
Rdt
P
st+1jst
t+1
P
st+1jst
t+1l
h
ql;t+1
h
( + ) (kl;t)
 + (1  ) kl;t
i
+ bt
l
 Rdt dt
i
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Next, we transform this equation using zt = ktCAPt ,
dt
zt
=
kh;t ktCAPt
ktCAPt
=
kh;t
ktCAPt
  1, the
households rst order condition Rdt
P
st+1jst t+1 =
t

, the fact that bt =
kh;t kt
~pt
, and the
expression for ~pt =
P
st+1jst t+1h
(kSPl;t )
 1
+1 
i

P
st+1jst t+1ql;t+1
(derived from the rst order condition
with respect to ~bl;t). We obtain:
1
1  t =
t+1(s)+t+1(s)lP
st+1jst
t+1
  t+1(s)+t+1(s)lP
st+1jst
t+1
 kh;t
kt
 1
CAPt
(A.15)
+t+1(s)
t
 1
kt
P
j2fh;lg
jqj (s)
h
( + ) (kj;t)
 + (1  ) kj;t
i
 1
CAPt
+t+1(s)
t
 1
kt
lql (s)
h
( + ) (kl;t)
 + (1  ) kl;t
i
 1
CAPt
+ 
t

"h
 (kl;t)
 1 + 1  
i
 P
st+1jst
t+1ql;t+1
#
kh;t
kt
  1

 1
CAPt
Note that equation (A:15) takes the form 1
1  t = Q
CAP
1;t +Q
CAP
2;t  1CAPt .
Next, suppose the social optimum in good aggregate states is implemented with binding
leverage regulation. Going through similar steps as the ones above, we can show that 1
1  t =
QLEV1;t +Q
LEV
2;t  1LEVt .
Proof of Proposition 5.
Given the assumption that no intermediary is bankrupt at t+1 for any st+1 2 fs; sg, the
rst order condition with respect to deposits evaluated at the optimal allocation is:
CAPt 
CAP
t + 
LEV
t 
LEV
t = (1   t)
P
j2fh;lg
j
P
st+1jst
t+1
n
qj;t+1
h
 (kj;t)
 1 + 1  
i
 Rdt
o
If the competitive equilibrium allocation coincides with the social optimum, then the rst
order conditions in these two environments yield
P
st+1jst
t+1
h
qj;t+1

 (kj;t)
 1 + 1  

 Rdt
i
=
0 for any j 2 fh; lg. Thus, we nd that CAPt CAPt +LEVt LEVt = 0, i.e., nancial regulations
do not bind in a bad aggregate state.
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter/Value Moment1
 =
 
1
1:04
1=4
Annual real interest rate of 4 percent
 = 0:29 Average capital income share for U.S. business sector, 19482014
 =

0:950 0:050
0:256 0:744

Average length and number of expansions and contractions of
U.S. business sector, 1947Q12015Q2
h = 0:15, l = 0:85 Share of nancial assets of brokers and dealers, 1987Q12015Q2
1Sources of data: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts and U.S. Flow of Funds
accounts. For more details, see Cociuba, Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt (2016).
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Table 2: Estimated Parameters
Panel A
Parameter Value
Share of nonnancial rms m = 0:6632
Fixed factor income share  = 0:0002
Depreciation rate  = 0:0257
Productivity parameters
nonnancial rms qm (s) = 0:98608
qm (s) = 0:94955
low-risk nancial rms ql (s) = 0:94968
ql (s) = 0:94957
high-risk nancial rms qh (s) = 1
qh (s) = 0:38221
Panel B
Moments Targeted1 Data4 Model
(in %) (in %)
Average value added share of corporate nonnancial sector 67:6 70:8
Average equity to asset ratio of the nancial sector 23:0 19:0
Average capital depreciation rate in economy 2:5 2:5
Average peak-to-trough decline in output during contractions2 6:4 7:7
Coe¢ cient of variation of output3 4:6 3:9
Coe¢ cient of variation of household net worth3 8:5 8:6
Average deposits over total household nancial assets 16:4 17:5
Recovery rate in bankruptcy 42:0 42:0
1Sources of data: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts and U.S. Flow of Funds
accounts. The recovery rate in bankruptcy is from Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2003).
2Total output is measured as the real value added for the U.S. business sector. We detrend
output by the average growth rate over the period 1947Q12015Q2. 3We calculate statistic
after detrending the variable by the average growth rate over the period 1987Q12015Q2.
4For more details on the data moments, see Cociuba, Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt (2016).
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Table 4: Rates of Return, Risk Taking and Welfare
1
p
Rd   1
p
Risk taking2 Welfare2
Experiment1 (in %) (in %)
1. Benchmark 2:21 1:78 1:73  0:0162
2. Optimal CAP:

1
p
; CAP ; 

2:40 1:60 0:03 0:0000
a. Lower CAP to 1 percent 2:21 1:79 1:78  0:0175
b. Raise CAP to 25 percent 2:65 1:34  3:37  0:0339
c. Lower  to zero 2:22 1:78 1:66  0:0147
3. Optimal LEV:

1
p
; LEV ; 

4:00 0:00 0:03 0:0000
a. Lower LEV to 1 percent 3:57 0:42 59:11  0:1970
b. Raise LEV to 20 percent 4:16  0:16  22:05  0:0429
c. Lower  to zero 3:62 0:37 52:60  0:1609
1See footnotes to Table 3 for a description of the experiments. 1=p denotes the return to
bonds and Rd the return to deposits. We average rates of return from simulations of 5; 000
periods, and then annualize. The return on deposits is 4 percent in all experiments. 2The
risk taking and welfare measures are averages over 5; 000 simulations of 1; 000 periods each.
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Figure 1: Timing of Model Events
Labor is chosen.
Production occurs.
Returns are paid.
Bankruptcy may occur.
Deposit insurance
may be necessary.
Household wealth is realized.
st-1  realized st unknown,
j unknown
Financial
intermediaries
choose bt-1  and
kt-1 , subject to
financial
regulations.
Financial
intermediaries
choose repo
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disregarding
financial
regulations.
Capital k
j,t-1
for production
at time t is
determined.
s
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 unknown,
j known
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              PERIOD t-1
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Figure 2: Social Optimum Can be Implemented with

1
p
; CAP ; 

or

1
p
; LEV ; 

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Figure 3: Optimal CAP and Optimal LEV Economies: Balance Sheet
Composition and Asset Returns
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Figure 4: Welfare and Risk Taking Relative to the Social Planner
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